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 OUTSOURCING EXPERT SERVICES BY STATE TRANSPORTATION 
DEPARTMENTS: A LOOK AT EFFECTS ON COST, QUALITY AND CHANGING 
EMPLOYMENT LEVELS  
 
Juita-Elena (Wie) Yusuf, Old Dominion University 
Lenahan O’Connell, Kentucky Transportation Center 
 
ABSTRACT 
Privatization has increasingly become a policy option for government agencies struggling 
to meet rising demands for services but with fewer resources. In the transportation arena, many 
state departments of transportation (DOTs) have privatized by outsourcing highway functions to 
the private sector.  But the outsourcing of technical and expert services such as those related to 
the design and construction of highway infrastructure may result in a smaller or less 
knowledgeable DOT workforce that is unable to perform the necessary contract management to 
ensure the quality of the work done by contractors. We posit an outsourcing process in which 
DOTs respond to the combination of increased demand for highway services and growing 
workforce constraints by contracting out much of the work formerly performed by in-house 
personnel. This, in turn, can produce perceptions of quality problems regarding the outsourced 
work and a subsequent expansion of the workforce. We examine the extent to which different 
highway-related tasks are being outsourced, the effect of workforce and employment factors on 
outsourcing, the perceptions of highway officials regarding the impact of outsourcing on cost 
effectiveness and service quality of the outsourced work, and subsequent employment levels. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, there has been a worldwide movement away from direct 
provision by public employees of government’s traditional functions. Increasingly governments 
contract with private sector firms for the procurement of public goods and services (i.e. 
privatization). It should come as no surprise that privatization has become a popular option for 
government agencies struggling with dwindling resources with which to provide public goods 
and services to an expanding population. Outsourcing and various public-private partnerships are 
seen as viable solutions to the challenge of meeting service needs in the face of what Osborne 
and Hutchinson (2004) label a “permanent fiscal crisis.” In the highway arena, which is the focus 
of this study, the turn to private sector contractors can be attributed to many factors, including 
state personnel shortages, the need for expertise, the pressure to reduce costs, and the potential 
for improved quality of service. 
 Contracting, however, poses risks to government agencies. The contracting relationship 
throughout American history has had more than its share of blemishes in the form of graft, 
corruption, shoddy work, and incompetence (Keeney, 2007; Durant, Girth, & Johnston, 2009). 
Thus, there is no a priori reason to assume that outsourcing will bring either lower costs or 
improved quality. Indeed, there is sufficient research to conclude that outsourcing does not 
automatically result in lower costs or improved quality in many situations (see for example 
Condrey & Battaglio, 2007; Hodge, 2000; Brudney, Fernandez, Ryu & Wright, 2005; Bowman & 
West, 2006).  It may even increase costs and/or lower quality (Sclar, 2000; Bendick, 1989). In that 
the results of outsourcing can vary from beneficial to deleterious, research is needed to examine 
its effects across the various governmental functions to which it has been applied. This study 
examines the outsourcing of highway-related functions by state departments of transportation 
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(DOTs).1 We specifically ask: what is the relationship between outsourcing and government 
employment in the context of highly technical and expert services such as the delivery of 
transportation infrastructure? We posit a dialectical sequence in which DOT’s outsource functions, 
which may result in private sector employees replacing government employees and thus reducing 
government employment. This reduction is followed by a subsequent increase in employment, 
which we suggest is in response to perceptions of reduced quality associated with outsourced work.  
Several studies have focused on privatization by state DOTs. However, most of the 
studies have been case studies of one or a few highway agencies (DeHart-Davis & Kingsley, 
2005; Gen & Kingsley, 2007; Lee & Kingsley, 2009; Ponomariov & Kingsley, 2008).  Our study 
employs the results of a survey sent to all state DOTs in the United States to explore the effects 
of outsourcing on the cost and quality of services. We examine the extent to which highway-
related tasks are being outsourced, the perceptions of highway officials regarding the impact of 
outsourcing on cost effectiveness and service quality, and the relationships between outsourcing 
and employment in the state DOT.  
In the next section, we review the research on state DOT contracting for services, followed 
by research on the effects of outsourcing on cost and quality. We then discuss the possible effects 
of outsourcing on the in-house capacity of DOTs to provide effective oversight.  We draw five 
hypotheses from the research, describe the data, and present the analysis and findings. The 
conclusion presents implications for the practice and study of outsourcing.  
 
RESEARCH ON CONTRACTING OUT FOR HIGHWAY SERVICES 
DOT Contracting for Highway Services as a Response to Inadequate Staffing 
                                                          
1 While our analysis involves state DOTs, our focus is on the highway functions of these DOTs.  Specifically, we 
examine changes in employment levels related to highway functions.  
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 Witheford (1997) traced the history of outsourcing by state DOTs and documented the 
considerable increase in the amount of work outsourced to external consultants by the 1990s. 
Design activities were the first to be widely outsourced, followed by maintenance activities in 
the 1970s and administrative functions in the 1980s.  This privatization trend continued into the 
2000s. Ellis et al. (2000) found that 85% of state DOTs were using outside consultants to 
perform some of their construction engineering and inspection activities. A 2002 survey 
conducted by the Council of State Governments (CSG) found that highway and transportation 
functions are widely privatized, with 61% of responding state DOTs reporting that they had 
outsourced 15% or more of their work (Chi et al., 2004).  
 Ponomariov and Kingsley (2008) identified several conditions conducive for a state DOT 
to outsource. The first condition, the expansion of transportation facilities, points to the increased 
demand due to a growing volume of automobile and truck traffic. The other conditions involve 
workforce shortages, including (1) public finance rules that limit the ability to hire and use state 
employees on transportation projects; (2) previous downsizing of the workforce; (3) retirements 
by an aging workforce; and (4) changing civil service rules that make it possible for employees 
to retire early from the DOT and then work for private contractors. Witheford (1999) and Warne 
(2003) observed that while federal legislations significantly increased the funds available to the 
states for highway programs, the states had static or reduced workforce levels with which to 
accomplish the work and were compelled to contract much of the work. 
Calderon et al. (2000) conducted an in-depth analysis of DOT workforce issues and 
outsourcing. They observed that competition with private industry for professional engineers was 
driving many decisions to contract for various engineering services.  Some states faced 
significant pay differences between the public and private sectors that caused additional 
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challenges for DOTs in hiring and retaining staff. To complicate matters, many states have been 
legally restrained from increasing the size of the work force, even when workloads have been 
rising (Rogge et al., 2003; Ponomariov & Kingsley, 2008).  Gen and Kingsley (2007) argued that 
state DOTs have contracted out to “bridge the labor gap” created by the reduction in the number 
of transportation and highway personnel.  Presumably, organizations outsource the work for 
which they are ill-suited or unprepared to perform (Durant et al, 2009).  
 The previous studies strongly suggest that highway outsourcing is as much a response to 
a shortage of qualified personnel to address growing demand for services as it is a reflection of a 
desire to economize on expenditures by reducing government personnel.  One indicator of this 
would be greater outsourcing by the DOTs with smaller workforces or whose workforces have 
been shrinking in prior years. Another would be outsourcing when utilization of  highway 
services goes up in a state, as indicated by an increase in VMT or lane miles.  Coupling 
workforce with utilization of the transportation system, offers one measure of the state DOT’s 
capacity.  Specifically, a high ratio would indicate the DOT has slack capacity to manage and 
maintain the state’s highway system.  In contrast, a low ratio would suggest low capacity to 
address any additional pressure or demand placed on the system.  Based on the literature on 
outsourcing of highway functions, we hypothesize that outsourcing is driven by the state DOT’s 
lack of capacity to meet additional demands placed on the highway system with its existing 
workforce. This lack of capacity can be measured both in terms of direct workforce measures 
(such as number of employees or growth in the number of employees) and the ratio of employees 
to vehicle miles travelled (VMT).     
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Hypothesis 1a:  As state DOT workforce capacity (measured as the DOT employment numbers, 
payroll and growth in employment numbers and payroll) decreases, state DOTs outsource more 
highway functions.  
Hypothesis 1b:  As state DOT capacity (measured as the ratio of the highway-related workforce 
to VMT in the state highway system) decreases, state DOTs outsource more highway functions.  
Of course, as suggested by the literature, outsourcing may also contribute to workforce 
reduction through loss of personnel as private sector workers replace government workers.  This 
raises the possibility of simultaneity in that a reduction in personnel can be the motive for 
outsourcing even as outsourcing can be a response to a shortage of qualified personnel.  
However, we overcome this concern regarding simultaneity by explicitly incorporating the time 
element into the analysis.  Specifically, we examine outsourcing as an outcome of employment 
factors from previous years.  It is unlikely that the outsourcing decision in any given year will 
influence the number of DOT employees in prior years or the growth (decline) in employment 
levels in the DOT over those prior years.  
 
The Impact of Outsourcing on Cost and Quality 
 Although most advocates of outsourcing argue that it reduces the cost of government, the 
empirical record suggests there are conditions under which it can in fact increase the cost of 
providing goods and services (Durant et al., 2009). Milward et al. (1993) contended that 
outsourcing can result in a “hollow state,” a condition likely to foster inadequate oversight of 
contractors. While Savas (2000) argued that competition in the bidding process is the key to 
reducing costs, there may not be a sufficient number of bidders to keep costs low (DeHoog, 
1990; Brown & Potoski,  2004).  A state DOT may come to rely on a limited number of 
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competitors, exposing it to the perils of small numbers bargaining (Williamson, 1975).  In fact, 
DOT officials may even abandon bidding by turning to direct solicitation of the contractors they 
trust (Gen & Kingsley, 2007). Moreover, the process of creating, executing and managing 
contracts requires significant time, effort, and personnel, the cost of which may cancel out any 
savings generated from outsourcing. Wilmot et al. (1999) found that contract management raised 
costs 20% above the in-house level, with the difference being almost completely due to the 
additional costs from contract preparation and supervision of the contracted work. 
 It is no surprise then that the empirical record on the effects of outsourcing is mixed 
(Boyne, 1998; Brudney et al., 2005). Often the savings associated with outsourcing are either 
small (Chi et al., 2004: Hodge, 2000; Rehfuss, 1990), or non-existent (Duggan, 2004). Even 
within the same study, the findings can be mixed. For instance, Brudney et al. (2005) found that 
close to 25% of state agencies reported contracting out decreased the cost of delivering services, 
while 29% reported higher costs.  
For transportation infrastructure and services, a CSG study (Chi et al., 2004) found that 
fewer than 5% of responding agencies reported cost savings of 10 percent or more. Ellis et al. 
(2000) observed that construction engineering costs when performed in house were 9% of total 
project costs but when performed by outside contractors were 12% of total project costs, and 
when DOT contract monitoring and administration costs were factored in, the outsourced work 
became 15% of the total project costs. 
 We found only one study that examined the impact of outsourcing on quality as well as 
cost (Brudney et al 2005). It found that respondents were more likely to view outsourcing as 
improving work quality (50% of respondents) than lowering costs (35% of respondents). Given 
the finding of previous studies on the minimal impact of outsourcing on cost savings and the 
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finding that outsourcing is more likely to improve quality than cost, coupled with the possible 
tendency to turn to contracting when in-house expertise is lacking (rather than to reduce costs), 
we hypothesize that state DOTs will be more likely to view outsourcing as improving the quality 
of service delivery than to lower the cost of providing services.   
Hypothesis 2   State DOTs will perceive outsourcing to be more likely to improve quality than to 
lower costs. 
 
The Subsequent Consequences of Outsourcing on Employment Levels 
An undesirable loss of skilled employees with in-house production capabilities is a 
possible consequence of the outsourcing process. When an organization performs work in-house, 
its employees often develop deep knowledge and expertise in regard to each step of the 
production process (Durant et al., 2009). Outsourcing lacks this advantage and can reduce an 
organization’s capacity to perform skilled work (Gen & Kingsley, 2007). Several years after 
outsourcing, an organization could find itself in need of in-house personnel with the requisite 
skills. 
We could find no studies on the impact of outsourcing on the subsequent employment 
levels of DOTs. But Donahue (2002: 275) found that, in general, the effect of outsourcing on 
employment levels was slight, and concluded that “[f]ar from cutting to the heart of public 
employment, privatization seems to have been (at least so far) nibbling around its edges.” Greene 
(2002) observed a similar pattern among local governments.  State DOTs may see reduced 
employment due to the actual outsourcing of work but given the emphasis on improved service 
quality over realizing cost savings, these state DOTs may also compensate by hiring additional 
staff or retaining existing staff for oversight and management tasks.  Therefore, the greater the 
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extent to which the DOT outsources highway functions, the greater the need for contract 
management and oversight and the lower the likelihood that the DOT will see reductions in its 
workforce.   Furthermore, the greater the expectation and perception of service quality problems, 
the more the state DOT will employ additional employees to ensure the desired level of quality.  
This also lowers the likelihood of workforce reductions due to outsourcing. In both situations, 
the state DOTs will likely see growth in its workforce due to the addition of staff for contract 
management and oversight.  Therefore, in studying the effect of outsourcing on DOT 
employment levels, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3a. State DOTs that outsource a greater percent of functions will add employees in 
subsequent years. 
Hypothesis 3b. State DOTs that perceive reduced quality from outsourcing will add employees in 
subsequent years.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 Our analysis involves two steps and spans the period from 1999 to 2007.  In the first part 
of the analysis we focus on the percent of functions outsourced by the different state DOTs (in 
2003) to determine if increased demand for highway services, employment levels and changes in 
employment levels over the prior three years are associated with the percent of highway 
functions that were outsourced.  The second analysis examines the linkage between outsourcing 
in 2003 and changes in highway-related employment over the subsequent four years.   
We rely on two sources of data. The first is a survey of the functions outsourced by state 
DOTs conducted in Fall 2003.  The second is official statistics compiled by the U.S. Census 
Bureau (employment data) and the U.S. Department of Transportation (highway data).  We also 
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collected political and economic data at the state level.  Specifically, our dataset included citizen 
and state government ideology (Berry et al. 1998), population, population density, gross state 
product, and unemployment rates.  These variables are intended to capture political and 
economic forces that may influence outsourcing and employment levels in state highway 
agencies.  However, as will be discussed in the results section, these variables were not included 
in the final model.  Table 1 summarizes the variables included in the analysis, their sources, and 
descriptive statistics. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Survey of Highway Functions Outsourced by State DOTs 
The survey of functions outsourced by state departments of transportation (DOTs) used in 
our study was responded to by 30 states. We obtained permission to use the results of that survey 
from its senior author. In October 2003, the survey instrument was sent to the highest level 
official in the highway division of the state DOT.  The surveys were filled out by that official or 
by their subordinates, such as state highway engineers or assistant state highway engineers.2 The 
survey included a list of 16 highway functions and asked respondents to indicate if any of the 
work associated with each of the functions was outsourced.  Note that respondents were not 
asked to estimate the percentage of the function that was outsourced, as it was unlikely that they 
                                                          
2 These high-level state DOT officials are often the ones responsible for making key executive-level decisions about 
outsourcing.  While it is possible that outsourcing decisions may be made at higher levels (for example, outsourcing 
may be required by statute for certain categories of projects or the DOT Director may make agency-wide decisions 
to outsource), the specific decisions about which projects to outsource and the evaluation of the service and cost 
impacts of outsourcing would be within the decision making realm of the DOT officials who responded to our 
survey. 
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would possess such knowledge across all functions.3  Highway functions in the survey covered 
all categories identified by Hancher and Werkmeister (2001).  Despite the inability to specify the 
extent to which work is outsourced within the individual highway functions, our analysis 
captures the variety of function that are outsourced by state DOTs.  Compared to other studies 
that do not specifically look across the many highway functions, our study examines outsourcing 
more broadly rather than focusing only on design or construction. Our focus is on the spread of 
outsourcing across the major functions of a highway agency, which we view as a measure of the 
extent of outsourcing. Some of the services included in the survey do not require technical 
expertise, but all entail an element of expertise in that the contractor must perform the expert task 
of organizing and supervising the work of both skilled and unskilled workers.   
In addition to identifying the specific functions outsourced by each state, the survey 
asked for an evaluation of the perceived impact of outsourcing on the cost and service quality of 
the work outsourced. That is, was the outsourced work worse, the same, or better than when 
performed in-house by the state DOT?  Respondents were asked to rate the impact of 
outsourcing each function on cost of service and quality of service on a Likert scale ranging from 
1 to 5.  A rating of one or two meant that outsourcing had a negative effect in terms of cost or 
quality; a three meant outsourcing produced no change in cost or quality; and a four or five 
indicated a positive change in cost or quality.  
Because only 30 state DOTs responded to the survey, nonresponse bias was a concern in 
that those who responded may be more likely to outsource to a greater or lesser degree compared 
                                                          
3 The percentage of functions outsourced does not necessarily reflect the amount of work outsourced.  A state DOT 
may outsource two different functions, but may only do so at 5% for one function and 95% for the other.  Similarly, 
two state DOTs may outsource construction, but one may outsource 80% of its construction activities while the 
other may only outsource 10%.  In this study, all instances of outsourcing are treated equally, regardless of 
differences across function within a state DOT or differences across state DOTs in a given function.  
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to those who did not.  To check for bias, we compared survey respondents against non-
respondents according to two other measures of privatization.  The first is a measure of whether 
the state had, in recent years, sold or leased major transportation assets to private firms (ULI – 
The Urban Land Institute and Ernst & Young, 2007).  The second is the percentage of 
transportation functions outsourced obtained from the 2002 CSG Survey (Chi et al. 2004).  Using 
both measures, there are no statistically significant differences between survey respondents and 
non-respondents in terms of their privatization activities, suggesting that nonresponse bias is not 
an issue.  
 
Transportation and Highway Data 
Our analysis also relies on data from the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Department of 
Transportation.  The former included data from the Census of Governments, and specifically 
employment data for road and highway-related functions.  This employment data included the 
number of full-time and part-time employees, the number of full-time equivalent employees, the 
number of hours worked by part-time employees, and payroll amounts.  Data from the U.S. 
Department of Transportation were taken from the Highway Statistics Series (produced by the 
Federal Highway Administration), which contains data on characteristics of travel, the highway 
system in the state, and highway finance.  Specific data collected from the Highway Statistics 
Series included data on state highway revenues, state expenditures for highway purposes, state 
capital outlays for highway purposes, vehicle-miles traveled in the state, and lane miles of the 
state highway system.   
 
RESULTS 
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Extent of Outsourcing of Highway Functions and Perceptions of Effectiveness 
Data from the survey of state DOTs indicate that most states outsource some part of a 
substantial number of highway functions.  Table 3 summarizes the outsourcing of different 
highway functions.  As observed earlier, the survey does not provide information about the 
extent to which each function was outsourced.  Also, given that the survey was administered 
only in 2003, we are limited in our ability to measure the year-to-year fluidity and the 
multidirectional nature of highway outsourcing over time.  However, while privatization 
practices in 2003 reflect prior decisions made with regard to outsourcing, it also reflects present 
year decisions to continue or discontinue contracting out with private sector firms.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
In public policy, perceptions can be of equal importance to facts.  The survey of state 
DOT outsourcing of functions asked the agency’s staff to provide their perceptions of the cost 
effectiveness and service quality of the highway functions outsourced.  Average responses for 
the different highway functions are presented in Table 2. The means on a 5-point scale (with 1 
being most negative effect, 3 being no effect, and 5 being most positive effect) were 3.2 for cost 
and 3.8 for quality. Thus, respondents reported almost no cost savings from outsourcing, while 
perceiving small improvements in the quality of service.  These results are supportive of 
Hypothesis 2, which predicted that perceptions of outsourcing’s effect on quality would be 
higher than perceptions of its effect on cost effectiveness.  That the perception of service quality 
are more positive compared to the perception of cost savings is statistically significant across all 
highway functions (t=6.236, p<0.0001).   Furthermore, this difference between perceived quality 
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and perceived cost savings does not vary depending on the extent to which the state DOT 
outsources.  Specifically, this difference is not correlated with the extent of outsourcing (r= –
0.1464, p=0.4661).   Therefore, state DOTs that outsource more functions do not perceive such 
outsourcing to contribute more to quality than to cost savings, or vice versa.  
The findings in Table 2 also show that highway departments are more likely to outsource 
some part of their core functions (e.g., planning, right of way, and design) than they are to 
outsource some part of their less central functions (e.g., traffic operations, equipment purchasing, 
and rest areas). Moreover, they do so despite indicating higher levels of quality and cost 
effectiveness from outsourcing the less central functions.  
 
Employment Factors Driving State DOT Outsourcing 
Our first regression model examines the extent to which the outsourcing of highway 
functions is associated with employment-related factors.  Table 3 presents the results of this 
analysis.  To arrive at this final model, we regressed the percent of highway functions outsourced 
in 2003 against four categories of independent variables.  The first are employment-related 
variables, which we expect will have a negative relationship with outsourcing.  This set of 
variables includes the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees per VMT in 1999, 
change in FTE employees per VMT between 1999 and 2002,  change in hours worked by part-
time employees between 1999 and 2002, and change in payroll as a percent of total highway 
expenses between 1999 and 2002.The second group of variables includes indicators of demand 
for highway services, such as  population density in 1999, change in vehicle miles traveled 
(VMT) and change in lane miles between 1999 and 2002.  Third, we have economic variables 
that control for resources available to and/or expended by the states and resources related to the 
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general economic environment in the state.  The former includes change in highway revenues 
and change in highway capital outlays between 1999 and 2002.  The latter includes gross state 
product and the unemployment rate.  We have a fourth set of variables that are intended to 
represent the political environment surrounding outsourcing decisions in the state.  These 
variables measure citizen ideology (Berry et al. 1998) and state government ideology (Berry et 
al. 2010) for 1999.4   
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 Given the small sample size and concerns over degrees-of-freedom in the analysis, we 
first ran a full model with variables from all four categories as independent variables.  In this full 
model, however, only employment-related variables were statistically significant.  Therefore, a 
more parsimonious model was then fit, with the percent of functions outsourced being a function 
of capacity and employment factors in 1999 (the number of FTE employees per VMT) and 
changes in capacity and employment factors between 1999 and 2002 (change in FTE employees 
per VMT, change in hours worked by part-time employees, and change in payroll as a percent of 
total highway expenses).  Overall, this reduced model was statistically significant (F=3.31, 
p=0.026).  The regression results for this reduced model are summarized in Table 3.  While the 
omission of the remaining three categories of independent variables may prompt concerns 
regarding an underspecified model and a negative effect on the explanatory power of the model, 
we believe the benefits of parsimony outweigh these concerns.  Analysis of the correlations 
                                                          
4 Updated data for citizen and state government ideology were obtained from: Fording, R. State Citizen and 
Government Ideology. http://www.bama.ua.edu/~rcfording/stateideology.html [Accessed June 5, 2012].  
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between the variables dropped from the model and those included in the final model suggest that 
omitted variable bias is not a problem.    
Regression results in Table 3 show support for Hypothesis 1, which predicts that state 
DOTs will outsource more functions as capacity, measured by the ratio of the highway-related 
workforce to state VMT, decreases.  Other  employment-related measures had the predicted 
negative relationship with the percent of highway functions outsourced and all were statistically 
significant.  Change in the state DOT’s capacity to address additional demands (measured as 
percent change in full time employment per VMT between 1999 and 2002) and change in payroll 
as a percent of total highway expenses between 1999 and 2002 were significant at the .01 level, 
while percent change in hours worked by part-time employees and number of FTE employees 
per VMT in 1999, were significant at the .05 level. Taken together, the results suggest that DOTs 
turn to outsourcing to meet rising use of (and demand placed on) the road and highway system 
when they lack capacity or are faced with a shortage of in-house personnel.  
 
Subsequent Consequences of Outsourcing on the Number of DOT Employees 
 To determine the effect of outsourcing on subsequent employment levels, we regressed 
the change in employment levels (measured as the percent change in the number of full-time 
equivalent (FTE) employees) from 2004 to 2007 on the percent of functions outsourced in 2003, 
the perceived service quality and cost effectiveness of the outsourced work in 2003, and several 
control variables.    We first ran a full model that included control variables to account for the 
initial size and capacity of the DOT workforce measured as the number of FTE employees and 
part-time employees as a percent of FTE employees (in 2004); several resource variables 
including highway revenues and highway capital outlays (in 2004) and the change between 2004 
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and 2007 in highway revenues and capital outlays; and demand variables such as change in lane 
miles and change in VMT between 2004 and 2007.  Similar to the model for the extent of 
outsourcing, additional independent variables also included population density, gross state 
product, unemployment rate, citizen ideology, and state government ideology.    
Following the full model, a reduced model was estimated that included percent of 
functions outsourced in 2003, service quality of outsourced work in 2003, cost effectiveness of 
outsourced work in 2003, in addition to control variables from the full model that were 
statistically significant at the p<0.10 level (number of FTE employees per VMT in 2004, percent 
change in capital outlays from  2004 to 2007, and percent change in VMT between 2004 and 
2007.  This model represents the most parsimonious model that includes the three outsourcing 
variables hypothesized to be related to changes in state DOT employment and control variables 
that are statistically significant predictors of changes in employment.  Due to concerns over 
omitted variable bias, the correlations between the variables omitted from the final model and 
those included in the final model were examined.5  The results of the final, reduced model are 
summarized in Table 4. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 Results of the regression analysis show that as predictors of the change in highway-
related FTE employment , the percent of functions outsourced was positive and marginally 
significant (p<.10) and the perceived service quality of outsourcing in 2003 (Hypothesis 3b) was 
negative and  statistically significant  (P<.05).   This provides support for Hypotheses 3a and 3b.  
                                                          
5 With the exception of  the correlation between GSP and cost effectiveness of outsourcing (r=0.389, p=0.0449), 
there were no other statistically significant correlations between omitted and included variables.   
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For every additional highway function outsourced by a state DOT (6.25% increase in percent of 
highway functions outsourced), the resulting impact on FTE employment is four-fold (27.7% 
additional growth in FTE employment).  In contrast, a unit decrease in the perceived service 
quality of outsourcing, for example going from 3 (outsourcing has no effect) to 2 (outsourcing 
has negative effect), results in a 95% increase in FTE employment.  As these results indicate, 
there is a strong relationship between subsequent employment and the extent of outsourcing and 
perceived service effectiveness of outsourcing.    However, outsourcing cost effectiveness was 
not statistically significant as a predictor of growth in DOT employment.   
 
The Overall Relationship between Outsourcing and DOT employment 
In addition to the regression analyses, we also developed a path model that summarizes 
the relationship between employment and outsourcing variables over multiple years. This path 
model is presented in Figure 1.  The path analysis shows that, in general, prior year employment 
factors – number of FTE employees per VMT in 1999, changes in the number of FTE employees 
per VMT between 1999 and 2002, changes in hours worked by part-time workers between 1999 
and 2002,  and payroll as a percent of total expenditures between 1999 and 2002 – negatively 
affect the extent to which highway functions are outsourced in 2003.   States with smaller DOT 
workforces and smaller payroll relative to total DOT expenditures, coupled with lower growth in 
full-time and part-time employment will subsequently outsource more highway functions.  In 
turn, this greater level of outsourcing and the perceived lower quality of the work outsourced 
contribute to greater growth in the state DOT workforce in subsequent years measured as the 
percent change in the number of FTE employees (between 2004 and 2007),. 
----------------------------------- 
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
-----------------------------------        
 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
We have four primary findings from our analysis of outsourcing of highway functions by 
state DOTs.  All have implications for our understanding of outsourcing and pose interesting 
questions for future research.  First, most state DOTs are outsourcing a substantial number of 
different highway functions. Of these functions, those requiring specialized or technical skills, 
such as assessment and acquisition of right-of-way, surveying/photogrammetry, and 
geotechnical/materials testing,  are outsourced more extensively (i.e. by more state DOTs).  One 
of the contributions of this study is that, unlike other studies on outsourcing, we explicitly 
address the different highway functions that state DOTs may outsource.  This allows for an 
examination of outsourcing across the different functions.  However, our analysis focuses on 
DOT outsourcing at the aggregate level. Future research could focus more on analyzing 
outsourcing of these different functions.  For example, researchers could examine whether if and 
how state DOTs are outsourcing core or central functions, or if they are focusing more on non-
core functions and purchasing services that are more peripheral to their essential tasks. 
Second, respondents from these state DOTs believe that outsourcing is more likely to 
improve quality than reduce costs.  They reported almost no cost savings from outsourcing and 
small improvements in the quality of service, which supports our hypothesis that perceptions of 
outsourcing’s effect on quality would be higher than perceptions of its effect on cost 
effectiveness. The respondents in the survey of DOT outsourcing reported an overall lack of 
perceived cost savings from their outsourcing, a finding similar to that of Brudney et al. (2005), 
 20 
which may be an artifact of two related factors.  First, our results imply that DOTs are probably 
more likely to outsource functions in areas where they lack sufficient expertise or lack a 
sufficient number of trained employees, and probably realize few cost savings when they have to 
pay the going rate for engineering skills, which tend to be costly. That cost savings are not 
associated with DOT employment levels might also be explained by the work of Ponomariov and 
Kingsley (2008) who found that the use of outsourcing, instead of being based on strategic 
decisions about potential cost reductions, has been spurred by incremental and reactive 
adaptations to internal and external events, such as a change in demand for services.  It thus 
appears that a desire to save money may have very little to do with much of the turn to 
outsourcing by DOTs.  Our finding that increased outsourcing led to higher employment levels 
in subsequent years is in line with research by Gransberg and Molenaar (2008), who in a survey 
of state DOTs found that a majority of the DOTs reported their professional workforce either 
remained the same or increased in size despite extensive outsourcing.  
Third, lack of state DOT capacity to address additional pressure or demand placed on the 
highway system increases the extent of DOT outsourcing.  Specifically, as state DOT capacity 
decreases, the DOT tends to outsource a greater number of highway functions.    
Finally, the extent of outsourcing and the perception of lower service quality from 
outsourcing have a positive effect on the level of subsequent state DOT employment. 
Conversely, our analysis shows that state DOTs that perceive outsourcing as providing service 
quality comparable to or better than direct provision may perceive less need to expand the 
workforce to address possible accountability issues. Positive perceptions of outsourcing service 
quality may then contribute to the DOT being more receptive to additional outsourcing, further 
reducing the need for in-house expertise.  Combined, these findings provide support for our  
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hypotheses and suggest that there is a relationship between outsourcing and employment within 
state DOTs that unfolds over time with opposite results.   
One possible (and logical) explanation for this relationship is  what can be labeled the 
accountability dilemma of outsourcing a complex task.  This dilemma can be expressed in the 
form of the question: How does a public administrator know that a contractor is doing a complex 
task well when he or she lacks a sufficient number of employees (or employees with the right 
expertise) to assess the work plan, the cost estimates, and the overall quality of the work 
delivered by the contractor?  While we believe that this kind of accountability dilemma could 
drive the subsequent increase in state DOT staff for management and oversight purposes, we do 
not have sufficient data in this study to test this.  Future research may be able to tease out the role 
of the accountability dilemma, if any, in explaining the continued growth in state DOT 
employment after a turn to outsourcing.   
Our findings suggest some additional implications for future research on the possible 
accountability dilemma associated with outsourcing government goods and services, particularly 
those that have high value-added or that involve significant technical expertise.  However, our 
findings are tentative, as our measure of outsourcing does not include the percent of each 
function outsourced.  And, of course, there are additional concerns motivating contracting out 
besides cost and quality. Moreover, these results may not be true of the less production oriented 
or technical-oriented government agencies (such as social services or corrections). Last, 
contracting out is a complex phenomenon that can have ramifications beyond those on the 
specific function in question, as savings in one area of an agency can impose costs on another. 
We must acknowledge several key limitations of our study. First, given the small number 
of states that responded to the survey of state DOTs, we had a small sample to work with. 
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Furthermore, while we attempted to incorporate political variables into our model, concerns for 
parsimony and over degrees-of-freedom prompted the exclusion of these variables. As such, our 
research does not address the role of political factors that have been argued to influence 
transportation policy and administration. These factors play an important role in broader state-
level policies regarding privatization, for example the decision to adopt privatization-enabling 
legislation. They may also influence agency-level decisions regarding privatizing government 
services or functions, although this connection is less clear. However, our analysis completely 
excludes political variables, so we are unable to address this linkage. 
 Another major limitation is the measurement of the extent of outsourcing.  Clearly, 
future research will need to look at a more comprehensive measure of outsourcing or some 
substitute for it such as the percent of the state highway budget spent on contracts. This would 
allow a better estimate of the extent to which the state highway program is outsourced and the 
relationship to DOT employment levels.  It would also be quite useful to extend the analysis to 
looking at the impact of outsourcing on highway performance indicators, particularly in light of 
questions about service quality of contracted work.  The literature suggests that increased 
privatization should be accompanied by increased contract management and oversight.  This 
might require not only additional employees, as suggested by our study, but also more 
specialized, highly-paid employees.  The latter is not addressed in this study, but may be 
examined by looking at payroll trends.   It is also of interest that maintenance, the function that 
employs the greatest number of highway department personnel, is less likely than many other 
functions to be outsourced. This requires further study, as some respondents may not have 
considered the more expensive and frequently outsourced forms of maintenance (e.g., one inch 
overlays) when responding to the survey.  
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On a final note, this study offers a unique dimension of outsourcing in that we 
incorporate concerns about service quality and cost effectiveness, which has been neglected not 
only by researchers in the transportation outsourcing arena but researchers in privatization and 
outsourcing more generally.  We used subjective measures of perceived service quality and cost 
effectiveness of the outsourced work, which may be cause for concern for some.  While 
objective measures may be better, such measures are not available and we argue that subjective 
perceptions remain important as they influence decision making within the state DOT to the 
same extent as objective measures. However, a greater concern would be that respondents may 
not know whether service quality or costs have improved or deteriorated following outsourcing.  
Specifically, they may not have a basis for making the comparison, for example, if they did not 
have exposure to the pre-contracting experience. Additionally, potential bias exists in the 
measure given that these respondents may also be involved in making the outsourcing decision, 
and may provide ex-post assessment that is consistent with or justifies the decision to outsource.  
Future research should examine how the subjective measures correlate with objective measures, 
to assess the extent to which subjective measures may be biased.   
. 
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Table 1. Variable Definition, Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name Definition and Source Year(s) Mean Std Dev Min Max 
% highway functions 
outsourced 
Percent of highway functions 
outsourced by the state DOT.  
Survey of Outsourcing Practices of 
State DOTs 
2003 65.125 29.058 6.000 90.000 
Service quality of 
outsourcing 
Rating of outsourcing service quality 
compared to direct provision, averaged 
across outsourced highway functions 
(1=negative, 3=no change, 5=positive). 
Survey of Outsourcing Practices of 
State DOTs 
2003 3.769 0.344 3.400 4.700 
Cost effectiveness of 
outsourcing 
Rating of outsourcing cost 
effectiveness compared to direct 
provision, averaged across outsourced 
highway functions (1=negative, 3=no 
change, 5=positive). 
Survey of Outsourcing Practices of 
State DOTs 
2003 3.244 0.388 2.700 4.000 
No. of FTE employees 
per VMT 
Number of full-time equivalent 
employees, hours worked by part-time 
employees, and total payroll for 
highway functions.   
Government Employment and Payroll 
Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau 
(http://www.census.gov/govs/apes/) 
Vehicle-miles traveled in the state (in 
millions).  
Highway Statistics Series 
1999 0.191 0.276 0.008 1.167 
No. of FTE employees 
per VMT 
2004 0.184 0.257 0.008 1.037 
%∆ in FTE employees per 
VMT 
1999-2002 65.481 278.294 -93.969 1455.562 
%∆ hours worked by part-
time employees 
1999-2002 5.747 103.649 -100.00 520.378 
∆ payroll as percent of 
total highway expenses 
1999-2002 -9.087 30.149 -147.011 9.907 
%∆ highway capital 
outlays 
Percent changes in capital outlays for 
the state highway system.  
Highway Statistics Series 
2004-2007 18.120 37.509 -40.922 114.169 
%∆ VMT  Percent change in vehicle-miles 
traveled (VMT) in the state. 
Highway Statistics Series 
2004-2007 2.498 3.305 -1.698 9.906 
Note: All dollar amounts are nominal.  Analysis using real dollar amounts (adjusted for inflation to 2007 dollars) did not produce 
significantly different results so the variables are included in nominal terms. 
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Table 2: Percent of States Outsourcing Function in 2003 and Average Effectiveness on Five 
Point Scale 
Function Percent of 
States 
Outsourcing 
Average Effectiveness Rating on a 5-
point Scale(a) 
Quality of Service Cost of Service 
Right of Way 90% 3.4 2.9 
Surveying/Photogrammetry 90% 3.6 3.1 
Design 87% 3.6 2.7 
Environmental Studies/Permits 87% 3.7 2.9 
Geotechnical/Materials Testing 87% 3.5 3.0 
Utilities/Railroad Coordination 87% 3.9 3.4 
Planning 81% 3.6 3.1 
Contract Procurement (Projects) 81% 3.7 3.1 
Construction 74% 3.5 2.8 
Construction Engineering (Oversight, 
Inspection, QA/Qc) 
74% 3.6 3.4 
Maintenance 71% 3.6 3.3 
Traffic Operations 55% 3.8 3.3 
Legal Services 32% 3.7 3.2 
Program Management (Annual or Multi-
year) 
25% 4.4 3.7 
Equipment Purchasing/Maintenance 15% 4.7 4.0 
Rest Areas 6% 4.0 4.0 
Mean 65% 3.8 3.2 
(a) 1 = most negative effect, 3 = no effect, and 5 = most positive effect 
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Table 3.  Results of regression model for percent of highway functions outsourced in 2003 
 Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
%∆ FTE 
employment per 
VMT, 1999 – 2002  
–0.011** 0.004 –0.247 
%∆ hours worked 
by part-time 
employees, 1999 – 
2002 
–0.032* 0.018 –0.212 
∆ payroll as percent 
of total highway 
expenses, 1999 – 
2002  
–0.013** 0.004 –0.237 
No. of FTE 
employees per 
VMT, 1999 
–37.095* 20.593 –0.659 
Constant 70.374*** 3.601  
Adjusted R2 0.127   
N 30   
*** p < .001 
** p < .01 
* p < .05 
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Table 4.  Results of regression model for percent change in full-time equivalent 
employment, 2004-2007 
 Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Standardized 
Coefficient 
Percent of highway 
functions outsourced, 
2003 
4.426** 2.879 0.238 
Service quality of 
outsourcing, 2003 
–95.404* 47.631 –0.111 
Cost effectiveness of 
outsourcing, 2003 
–92.827 106.952 –0.184 
No. of FTE employees 
per VMT(in thousands), 
2004 
–330.875* 187.612 –0.290 
%∆ in capital outlays, 
2004-2007 
1.388** 0.555 0.177 
%∆ in VMT, 2004-
2007 
8.075* 4.301 0.091 
Constant 356.925 230.365  
Adjusted R2 0.456   
N 27   
*** p < .001 
** p < .01 
* p < .05 
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Figure 1.  Path analysis (Using Standardized Estimators) 
1999 – 2002                                                       2003                                      2004-2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** p < .001   ** p < .01   * p < .05   t p< .10 
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